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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Appellate Case No. 20020578-CA

v.
RANDALL LAW,
Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant relies on his opening brief and replies to the State's brief as follows.
Arguments not addressed in reply were either adequately covered in the opening brief or do
not require response.
ARGUMENT
Point 1.

This Case is a Case of First Impression. It Constitutes an Extraordinary
Circumstance that Falls Outside the General Meaning and Purpose of Rule 11 of
the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.

The State claims that Appellant's argument fails for lack of record support. The State
cites to case law that limits an appellate court's review to 'the evidence contained in the
record on appeal," and that "an appellant's addendum may not consist of evidence that is
outside the record on appeal. State v. Pliego, 974 P.2d 279, 280-281 (Utah 1999). While these

are well-established interpretations of Rule 11 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE/
the extraordinary circumstances of this case fall outside the purpose and affect of Rule 11.
"The role of the appellate court is to sift through the parties9 arguments in the light of
the facts found by the trial court and square them with the law." Olson v. Part-Craig-Olson,
Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah Ct App, 1991) (citation ommitted). The appellate court may
"only weigh those facts and legal arguments preserved for [it] in the trial record." Id.
Therefore, the ban on allowing evidence not found in the trial record is meant to stop the
appellate courtfromreviewing a decision based on new evidence that is pertinent to the
decision itself.
Rule 11 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE provides the procedure with
which to supplement the trial record. According to Rule 11(h), "[i]f anything material to
either party is omittedfromthe record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by
stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate court... may direct that the omission or
misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and
transmitted." This Court has held that a motion under Rule 11(h) "is appropriate only when
the record must be augmented because of an omission or exclusion, or a dispute as to the
accuracy of reporting, and not to introduce new material into the record." Olsen, 815 P.2d at
1359.
Rule 11 has been interpreted to mean a complete ban on any and all evidence pertinent
to appeal that is not contained in the record of the trial court. But the rule deals solely with

1

Utah R. of App. P. 11 governs the record on appeal.
2

evidence upon which the decision was based. While that may apply to most cases that have
been heard by the appellate courts, this case presents a unique situation.
This is a case of first impression. The circumstances in this case are highly
extraordinary. The appeal stemsfroma judge who abused his discretion at sentencing due to
his regular use of drugs and the physical and mental consequences of such drug abuse. Now
this same judge has been convicted of charges stemmingfromhis drug abuse. Appellant is not
asking this Court to review the sentence based upon the judge's factualfindingsnor on any
facts presented to the judge. Appellant is seeking review based on the extrinsic factors which
influenced the judge, namely the judge's drug abuse. This is a new classification of evidence
which Rule 11 and the subsequent case law does not address, and which this Court must now
address. The appellate court cannot be blindly bound to the record in this instance.
As such, the supplemental procedures outlined in Rule 11(h) do not automatically apply
in this situation. As this court has held, a motion to supplement the record is available only
when there is an omission or exclusion of evidence that had appeared below, or a dispute as to
the accuracy of reporting, giving rise to the need to augment the record. See Olson, 815 P.2d
at 1359. That is not the case here, as the evidence in question is pertinent extrinsic evidence
as to the state of mind of the judge during sentencing. The fact that such evidence could not
exist in the trial record cannot impede this Court's ability to review the decision in the lower
court. Such a consequence would result in a great inequity for any person seeking appeal
under a related circumstance. It would result in a defendant being subject to the whims of a
trial judge who, under some harmful external influence, abused his discretion, without any
ability to have an appellate court review and correct the injustice.
3

The State relies on State v. Pliego, 974 P.2d 279 (Utah 1999), which provides an allencompassing ban on any and all evidence outside the record. Br. Aplee at 6. As detailed
above, this is the precise interpretation that could result in the inability of an appellate court to
review abuses of discretion by the trial court below. This Court should, therefore, specify an
exception, taken on a case by case basis, for review of such pertinent extrinsic evidence as is
necessary to prevent injustice.
Since the strict procedure set forth in Rule 11(h) for supplementing the record does not
apply in this instance, as shown above, the factors with which the court should evaluate the
need for supplemental material are not automatically required. These factors "include the
necessity of the supplemental material, prior opportunity to introduce the supplemental
material and length of the resulting delay/9 Jeschke v. Willis, 793 P.2d 428 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). These factors, however, are relevant to the situation presented here. The necessity of
the extrinsic material is clear; Judge Harding, Jr., has been convicted of drug possession and
use during the period of time that he determined Appellant's sentence.2 This evidence is
necessary in the determination of the soundness of Appellant's sentence. There was no prior
opportunity to introduce the evidence, as Judge Harding, Jr., failed to disclose any drug abuse,
and this abuse did not come to light until his arrest a short time after the final sentencing
hearing. There is no delay that will affect this appeal due to the allowance of this evidence.
Therefore, even considering the factors for allowing supplemental evidence, this evidence
should be allowed.

2

The further evidence of the inequity of Appellant's sentence is fully discussed in Appellant's
opening brief.
4
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13 March 2002
Ms. Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
Re: Jones v. State, No. 20010375-CA
Dear Ms. Stagg:
This letter is offered pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Shortly before the State filed its brief on 23 January 2002, the Utah Supreme Court issued
State v. Jones, 2002 UT 01,
Utah Adv. Rep. , which is relevant to whether
defendant can challenge the evidence supporting his conviction after entering a guilty and
mentally ill plea. See Aplt. Br. at 6-7; Aple. Br. at 10-12. A copy of Jones, as it was
reissued in early March, is attached for your convenience.
Respectfully submitted,

Karen A. Klucznik '
Assistant Attorney General

cc: David Thayne Jones, Petitioner, pro se (with enclosures)
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

No. 20000238

v.
F I L E D
Jeffrey Lynn Jones,
Defendant and Appellant.

January 4, 2002

The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor
Second District Court, Weber County
Attorneys:

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christopher D.
Ballard, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City,
Sandra L. Corp, Ogden, for plaintiff
Maurice Richards, Jerald N. Engstrom, Ogden,
for defendant

HOWE, Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
$1
Defendant Jeffrey Lynn Jones appeals his convictions
which were based on his conditional plea of guilty and mentally
ill to two counts of attempted aggravated murder, both first
degree felonies, in violation of section 76-5-202 (1) (b) & (c) of
the Utah Code (1999). Defendant's plea reserved the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to quash the bindover.
BACKGROUND
12
After consuming beer and whiskey at his father's home,
defendant entered a convenience store in Ogden, Utah, carrying a
loaded shotgun. He immediately shot and wounded a customer, Dan
Nebeker, and then leaned over the counter and shot Karan Rice,
the store's clerk. Next, defendant turned around and shot
Nebeker a second time. He then took additional shells from his
pocket, reloaded the shotgun, and fired two more times at Rice.
Finally, defendant laid the shotgun on the store counter, called

911, and reported that he had killed two individuals. He stayed
on the telephone until the police arrived and arrested him. Both
victims survived the incident.
13
Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted
aggravated murder, both first degree felonies, in violation of
section 76-5-202 (1)(b) & (c). After a preliminary hearing, the
court bound over defendant for trial on both counts.
Subsequently, he moved to quash the bindover, arguing that the
State could not properly charge him with attempted aggravated
murder because that crime does not exist in Utah. The district
court denied the motion to quash the bindover, and defendant
petitioned this court to review the interlocutory order. We
denied that petition.
14
Defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty and
mentally ill, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his
motion to quash the bindover. Following a hearing to determine
defendant's mental status, the district court found that he
suffered from depression and anxiety, but, "in spite of these
problems . . . the real motivation involved in the commission of
this [crime] didn't relate to those things." Instead, the court
attributed the crime to "excessive amounts of alcohol and the
defendant's character." The court concluded that he was not
mentally ill as defined by section 76-2-305 of the Utah Code and
sentenced him to serve two concurrent terms of five years to
life. Defendant now appeals his convictions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
i5
Whether the crime of attempted aggravated murder exists
in Utah is a question of law, reviewed for correctness, giving no
deference to the trial court's conclusion. Stephens v.
Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 519, 519 (Utah 1997). The
trial court's finding that defendant was not mentally ill is a
factual determination reviewed for clear error, giving deference
to the trial court's findings. State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621,
627 (Utah 1987) .
ANALYSIS
16
Defendant raises two arguments: (1) the trial court
erred when it refused to quash the bindover on two counts of
attempted aggravated murder because that crime does not exist,
and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to find him mentally
ill at the time of sentencing. We address each issue in turn.
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I. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER
17
Defendant contends he was improperly charged with
attempted aggravated murder because that crime does not exist in
Utah. He was charged under section 76-5-202 (1) (b) and (c) of the
Utah Code, which provides:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated
murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly
causes the death of another under any of the
following circumstances:

(b) the homicide was committed
incident to one act, scheme, course
of conduct, or criminal episode
during which two or more persons
were killed, or during which the
actor attempted to kill one
or more persons in addition to the
victim who was killed;
(c) the actor knowingly created a
great risk of death to a person
other than the victim and the
actor[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1999).
The purpose behind the
aggravating circumstances requirement is "to distinguish between
those types of murders which the legislature feels should be
punished more severely than other murders." State v. James, 819
P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). There is no requirement that a
defendant
kill the "two or more" persons referred to in
subsection (1)(b) or that a defendant kill
one person and be a party to the murder of
the others. The killings must occur during
one act, scheme, course of conduct, or
criminal episode, but the defendant need only
be responsible for one of them.
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 459 (Utah 1994).
In the case
before us, defendant asserts that because the incident resulted
in the wounding of two victims, but not in the death of either of
them, the aggravating circumstances listed in section
76-5-202(1) (b) and (c) are not applicable to his case.

3
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18
Because both victims survived, the State charged
defendant with attempted aggravated murder. In support of his
contention that the charged crime does not exist, defendant
relies upon State v. Bell, where we held that "the felony murder
rule cannot be applied unless the death of another occurred.
Thus, the crime of attempted felony murder does not exist as a
crime in Utah." 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989). Defendant's argument,
however, confuses felony murder with attempted murder. Under the
felony murder doctrine, any death resulting from the commission
or attempted commission of an enumerated felony is enhanced to
murder, regardless of the intent of the actor. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-202 (1) (d) (1999). Because the felony murder doctrine
does not demand proof of intent, the statute requires death of a
victim in order to constitute that crime. See Bell, 785 P.2d at
390.
19
In contrast, an attempted murder is "an act done with
the intent to commit that crime . . . but falls short of its
actual commission." State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah
1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Standiford, 769
P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 1988). Sectaon 76-4-101 of the Utah Code
provides:
(1) For purposes of this part a person is
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the offense,
he engages in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward commission of
the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does
not constitute a substantial step unless it
is strongly corroborative of the actor's
intent to commit the offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999). Thus, the offense of attempt
requires an intent tQ commit a specific offense. See Bell, 785
P.2d at 390. "In establishing the nexus between intent and act
it must be borne in mind that an attempt transcends intent, yet
fails to culminate in its planned accomplishment." State v.
Castonquav, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983). The intent required
to commit attempted aggravated murder is "the same intent as that
required to commit the murder itself and may be inferred from
defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances." State v.
Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Howard,
405 A.2d 206, 212 (Me. 1979) (stating the "person is guilty of
criminal attempt if he acts with the intent to complete the
commission of target offense").
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^10 In Bell, the defendant shot his victim during the
commission of a robbery. Because the victim survived, this court
held that the defendant was improperly charged with attempted
felony murder. 785 P.2d at 394. However, the facts in the
instant case differ significantly from those in Bell. Here,
defendant was not committing an underlying felony when the act of
shooting his victims occurred. Instead, acting with the kind of
culpability required to commit aggravated murder, he
intentionally and knowingly walked into the convenience store,
with no apparent purpose other than to shoot someone. He did
everything he could to facilitate the offense short of inflicting
actual death. Defendant conducted himself in such an unambiguous
way as to not reasonably allow for any other mens rea. See
Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, What Constitutes Attempted Murder,
54 A.L.R.3d 612 (1973). The facts, and the absence of any
innocent explanation for his conduct, are strongly corroborative
of his intent to commit aggravated murder. Thus, Bell is not
supportive of his position.
Sill Defendant contends that the State did not prove his
intent to kill anyone in the shootings, and that "absent the
physical facts" surrounding the incident, there was no evidence
of whether he merely intended to injure rather than kill his
victims. His contention lacks merit. Normally, "where it takes
a particular intent to constitute a crime that particular intent
must be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence, which
would warrant the inference of the intent with which the act was
done." Castonquay, 663 P.2d at 1326 (quoting Thacker v.
Commonwealth, 114 S.E. 504, 505 (1922)). However, in this case,
defendant waived the right to raise this argument. The
obligation of the State was relieved when defendant admitted his
intent by pleading guilty and mentally ill to the charges against
him. Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Utah 1996) (holding
that when an accused pleads guilty, he gives up the presumption
of innocence). Thus, the State's burden of proof was eliminated
when defendant formally admitted his intent by pleading guilty
and mentally ill as charged.
II. MENTAL ILLNESS
112 Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it
failed to find him mentally ill at the time of sentencing.
Section 76-2-305 of the Utah Code defines mental illness as
(4)(a) . . . a mental disease or defect that
substantially impairs a person's mental,
emotional, or behavioral functioning. A
mental defect may be a congenital condition,
the result of injury, or a residual effect of

5
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a physical or mental disease and includes,
but is not limited to mental retardation.
(b) "Mental illness" does not mean:
(i) a personality or character
disorder; or
(ii) an abnormality manifested primarily
by repeated criminal conduct.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1999).
1113 In this case, the State's expert testified that in her
opinion defendant was not mentally ill within the definition
provided by section 76-2-305. In contrast, defendant's expert
witness testified that alcoholism was a mental illness.
Defendant complains that the trial court disregarded the
testimony of his expert witness. However, "the fact finder was
not obliged to accept his disclaimers, but could draw his own
conclusion from the evidence." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127,
131 (Utah 1987) (citing State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74-75
(Utah 1981)). The fact that there is a diagnosis does not result
in the court being required to find defendant mentally ill; the
question is whether the diagnosis is a mental illness under the
statute. Thus, it was not clear error for the trial court to
refuse to find him mentally ill.
K14 Lastly, defendant contends that the trial court should
have applied section 76-5-205.5 to reduce his conviction to
attempted murder. However, "we do not consider this argument as
it is presented for the first time on appeal, and there is no
record before this court to substantiate [defendant's] claim."
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131. Even if this court were to address the
claim, subsection (3) of the statute provides:
(3) A defendant who was under the influence
of voluntarily consumed, injected, or
ingested alcohol, controlled substance, or
volatile substances at the time of the
alleged offense may not claim mitigation of
the offense under this section on the basis
of mental illness if the alcohol or substance
caused, triggered, or substantially
contributed to the mental illness,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5(3) (1999). Here, the trial court
found that "excessive amounts of alcohol which [defendant] was
consuming at the time" motivated him to shoot his victims. Thus,
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defendant is precluded from mitigation of his offense under this
section.
CONCLUSION
115 We hold that attempted aggravated murder does exist as
a crime and that the record supports that defendant committed
that crime. We hold further that there is sufficient evidence to
support the trial court's factual determination that defendant
was not mentally ill. Therefore, we affirm defendant's
convictions and sentences.

fl6 Associate Chief Justice Russon, Justice Durham,
Justice Durrant, and Justice Wilkms concur in Chief Justice
Howe's opinion.
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